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Abstract
We consider a college admissions problem with uncertainty. Unlike Gale and
Shapley (1962), we realistically assume that (i) students' college application choices
are nontrivial because applications are costly, (ii) college rankings of students are
noisy and thus uncertain at the time of application, and (iii) matching between
colleges and students takes place in a decentralized setting. We analyze an equilib-
rium model where two ranked colleges set admissions standards for student caliber
signals, and students, knowing their calibers, decide where to apply to.
Do the best students try to attend the best colleges? While application noise
works against this, we show that weaker students may apply more ambitiously
than stronger ones, further overturning it. But we prove that a unique equilib-
rium with assortive matching of student caliber and college quality exists provided
application costs are small and the capacity of the lesser college is not too small.
We also provide equilibrium comparative static results with respect to college ca-
pacities and application costs. Applying the model, we ¯nd that racial a±rmative
action at the better college comes at the expense of diversity at the other college.
¤Lones is grateful for the ¯nancial support of the National Science Foundation.
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The college admissions process has been the object of much academic scrutiny lately.
This interest in part owes to the strategic nature of college admissions, as schools use
the tools at their disposal to attract the best students. Those students, in turn, respond
most strategically in making their application decisions. This paper examines the joint
behavior of students and colleges in an economic framework.
We develop and °esh out an equilibrium model of the college admissions process,
with decentralized matching of students and two colleges | one better and one worse,
respectively, called 1 and 2. Better and worse here refers to the payo®s students earn
from attending the college. The model captures two unexplored aspects of the `real-
world' problem. First, each college application is costly, and so students must solve a
nontrivial portfolio choice problem. Second, colleges only observe a noisy signal of each
applicant's caliber, and seek to ¯ll their capacity with the very best students possible.
Our ¯rst contribution is methodological: We provide an intuitive graphical analysis
of the student choice problem that fully captures the application equilibrium. We hope
that this framework will prove a tractable workhorse for future work on this subject.
It embeds both the tradeo®s found in search-theoretic problems of Chade and Smith
(2006), and the colleges' choice of capacity-¯lling admission standards.
On the one hand, assuming uncertain college prospects and costly applications is
realistic, for college application entails a non-negligible cost and almost no students
know which of the better colleges will admit them. Did their essay on how they will
change the world go well with Harvard, or ring hollow? On the other hand, absent
uncertainty or application cost, the student problem trivializes | as they would either
simply apply to the best college that would admit them (the noiseless case) or to both
colleges (the costless case). The tandem of noisy caliber and costly applications feeds
the intriguing con°ict at the heart of the student choice problem: Gamble on Harvard,
settle for Michigan, or apply to Harvard while insuring oneself with Michigan.
A central question addressed in this paper is: Does assortative matching between
students and colleges emerge? Whether the best students attend the best colleges is
far from obvious, because two forces must cooperate. First, student applications must
increase in their caliber. Speci¯cally, we argue that this means that: (i) the best students
apply just to college 1; (ii) the middling/strong students insure by applying to both
colleges 1 and 2; (iii) the middling/weak students apply just to college 2; and ¯nally,
1(iv) the weakest students apply nowhere. There are theoretical reasons for using the
strong set order, but notice from an empirical standpoint that it would deliver the
desirable property that the expected calibers of students is higher at college 1 than at
college 2. The answer is far from obvious, as we show that the student portfolio choice
problem can fail the standard conditions for monotone behavior in the student's caliber.
Secondly, does college 1 impose a higher admission standard than 2? This need not
hold if 1's capacity is too large for its caliber niche, for then a curious inversion may
arise | college 2 may screen applicants more tightly than college 1. This observation
that college standards re°ect not only their inherent caliber but also their capacity is
our second contribution. We show that a unique equilibrium with assortative matching
exists when application costs are small and the capacity of the lesser college is not too
small. Furthermore, in this equilibrium, the distribution of calibers among the students
who enroll in the better college stochastically dominates that of the lesser college.
When matching is assortative, the equilibrium exhibits some interesting comparative
statics. In particular, we uncover an externality of the lesser upon the better college.
If college 2 raises its capacity, then this lowers the admissions standards at both col-
leges. The reason is that the marginal student that was previously indi®erent between
just applying to college 2 and adding college 1 as well, now prefers to avoid the extra
cost; he applies to college 2 only. This portfolio reallocation pushes down college 1's
admission standards. Notice that both cost and noise play a role here, for without noise
students do not send multiple applications, and without cost all of them trivially apply
to both colleges. For instance, our theory predicts that when the University of Chicago
substantially raised its college capacity in the 1990's, if its College payo® level remained
constant, then better ranked Ivy League schools should have dropped their standards.
We provide an application of our framework by examining the e®ects of race-based
admissions policies. While one college may experience greater diversity of its student
body from such a policy, it comes at the cost of reduced diversity at the other school.
On balance, we show that the average composition of the student body is not necessarily
weakened by introducing such a policy, although some weaker students will be admitted.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. Gale and Shapley initiated the
college admissions problem in their classic 1962 work in the economics of matching. As
the prime example of many-to-one matching, it has long been in the province of cooper-
ative game theory (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor (1990)). Our model varies by introducing
2the realistic assumption that matching is decentralized and subject to frictions, where
the frictions are given by the application cost and the noisy evaluation process.
Whether matching is assortative has been the organizing question of the two-sided
matching literature since Becker (1973). This has already been °eshed out in many
symmetric one-to-one matching settings. Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith (1997)
characterized it for search frictions, while Anderson and Smith (2005) and Chade (2006)
found di®erent answers for incomplete information depending on whether reputations
are private or public. But in this many-to-one college matching setting, the sides play
di®erent roles, as colleges control standards while students choose application sets.
The student portfolio problem embedded in the model is a special case of the simul-
taneous search problem solved in Chade and Smith (2006). Here, we use their solution
to characterize the optimal student application strategy. However, the acceptance prob-
abilities here are endogenous, since any one student's acceptance probability depends
on which of her peers also applies to that school. Thus, this paper is also contributes to
the literature on equilibrium models with nonsequential or directed search (e.g., Burdett
and Judd (1983), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), and Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman
(2002)), as well as Kircher and Galenianos (2006) and Kircher (2006).
A related paper to ours is Nagyp¶ al (2004). She assumes that colleges precisely
know each student's caliber, and students only imperfectly so | they observe normal
signals and update their beliefs before applying. We believe that assuming noisy college
assessments is more realistic. Also, it a®ords a de¯nition of assortative matching that is
in line with literature cited above.1 Arguably, neither students themselves nor colleges
know the true talent; however, we feel that students have the informational edge.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is found in Section 2.
Section 3 turns to the main results | an analysis ¯rst of the student portfolio choice
problem, and next of the equilibria. We focus on their assortative matching and com-
parative statics properties. For clarity of exposition, the main results are derived in the
text for a uniform signal distribution, but we show in the appendix that they extend to
a large class of monotone likelihood signals, as well as conditionally correlated signals.
Section 5 applies our framework for race-based admissions policies. Section 6 concludes.
1In Nagyp¶ al (2004), a student's caliber is his posterior belief over possible qualities, which is para-
meterized not only by the posterior mean but also by the posterior variance. This makes the de¯nition
and interpretation of what constitutes assortative matching less clear cut.
2In a richer model, students and colleges alike would have signals of the student's true caliber.
Colleges then have signals of signals, and our assorting conclusions should extend.
32 The Model
We impose very little structure in order to focus on the essential features of the problem.
There are two colleges 1 and 2, and a continuum of students with measure equal to one.
Thus, student choice matters, but there is no ex-post enrollment uncertainty. We assume
common values: Students agree that college 1 is the best (payo® 1), and college 2 not
as good (payo® u 2 (0;1)), but still better than not attending college (payo® 0).
Signals of Student Caliber. Any given student is equally desired by both
colleges. However, there is an informational friction here, as colleges only observe noisy
signals of any student's caliber. The caliber x is described by the atomless density f(x)
with support [0;1). While students know their caliber, colleges do not. Colleges 1
and 2 each observe a noisy conditionally i.i.d. signal of each applicant's caliber.3
To simplify the presentation of the main results, we assume in the text that each
college observes the signal ¾ drawn from a uniform distribution whose support depends
on the student's caliber x: The conditional density is g(¾jx) = 1=x on [0;x], and zero
elsewhere. The corresponding cdf is then G(¾jx) = ¾=x when 0 · ¾ · x, and later 1.
Later on, we extend our results to an arbitrary signal density g(¾jx) with the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP).
Student and College Actions. Students may apply to either, both, or neither
college. Each application costs c > 0, and applications must be sent simultaneously. To
avoid trivialities, we assume u > c. Students maximize their expected college payo® less
application costs. Colleges accept or reject each student, and seek to ¯ll their capacities
·1;·2 2 (0;1) with the best students. We focus on the interesting case in which limited
college capacity does not a®ord room for all students to attend college, as ·1 + ·2 < 1.
In this setting, students' strategies can be summarized by a correspondence S(x),
which selects, for each caliber x, a college application menu in f?;f1g;f2g;f1;2gg.
College i = 1;2 must set an \admission standard" ¾ i 2 [0;1) for signals, above which
it accepts students.4 College 1 knows that it will be accepted by any student admitted to
both colleges, while college 2 knows that it will be rejected in that event. Thus, student
x's acceptance chance at college i is given by ®i(x) = 1¡G(¾ ijx). Since a higher caliber
student x generates stochastically higher signals, ®i(x) is increasing in x.
3Such a signal may possibly arise from a college-speci¯c essay or interview. If a common SAT score
is taken into consideration, then the signals are perfectly correlated. We analyze this case in x7.
4Such a rule is optimal for colleges that seek to maximize the expected caliber of their student body.
We will show this formally in the Appendix; for now, we will assume it.





2), Se(x) is an optimal college application portfolio for each x,
(b) Given Se(¢), college i = 1;2, exactly ¯lls its student capacity given ¾e
i.
An equilibrium exhibits positive assortative matching (PAM) if colleges and students'
strategies are monotone. This means that ¾e
1 > ¾e
2 and that Se(x) is increasing in x
| namely, under the \strong set order" ranking ? Á f2g Á f1;2g Á f1g. In this way,
better colleges are more selective and higher caliber students choose better portfolios.
Furthermore, for any distribution over students' calibers, the average student caliber
applying to college 1 exceeds that applying to college 2. This empirical relevance is
perhaps more convincing than the coincidence with the strong set order.
3 Equilibrium Analysis for Two Benchmark Cases
Two realistic modi¯cations of the Gale-Shapley model play a key role in all our results.
First, applications are costly, and second signals of students' calibers are noisy. To
appreciate the role of each, we now analyze the model with each feature separately.
3.1 The Noiseless Case
Assume that colleges directly observe students' calibers x. Absent uncertainty, students
will simply apply to the best school to accept them, and colleges will set thresholds
¾ 1;¾ 2 to ¯ll their capacities. In this case, we cannot have ¾ 1 · ¾ 2, for then no student
would apply to the worse college 2 | impossible in an equilibrium. Assuming ¾ 1 > ¾ 2:
S(x) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
f1g if x ¸ ¾ 1
f2g if ¾ 2 · x < ¾ 1
? if x < ¾ 2








where the right sides in (1) measure the students who apply to each college.
5Theorem 1 (Noiseless Case) Let ·1 2 (0;1) and ·2 2 (0;1¡·1). Then there exists
a unique equilibrium (¾e
1;¾e
2), and it exhibits PAM. Furthermore, ¾e
1 falls in ·1, and is
independent of ·2 and c; ¾e
2 falls in ·1 and ·2, and is independent of c.
3.2 The Costless Case
Now assume a zero application cost. Everyone applies to both colleges, S(x) ´ f1;2g.
Student behavior is then trivially (weakly) monotone. However, the college acceptance
thresholds may satisfy ¾ 1 > ¾ 2 or ¾ 2 > ¾ 1, depending on the relative capacities ·1;·2.





























where the right side of (2){(3) is the measure of students that apply to, are accepted by,
and enroll in each college. For instance, the second term on the right side of (3) states
students with ¾ > ¾ 1 that will end up in college 2 consists of those students who are
rejected by college 1 and accepted by college 2.












Theorem 2 (Costless Case) For each ·1 2 (0;1), there exists ·2 2 (0;1 ¡ ·1) s.t.
(a) If ·2 2 (·2;1 ¡ ·1), then there is a unique equilibrium, and it has ¾e
1 > ¾e
2.
(b) If ·2 2 (0;·2), then there is a unique equilibrium, and it has ¾e
2 > ¾e
1.
(c) The threshold ¾e
1 falls in ·1, and is independent of ·2; ¾e
2 falls in both ·1 and ·2.
Summarizing, equilibrium in the noiseless case always exhibits PAM, while PAM can
fail in the costless case since college behavior need not be monotone. For if college 2's
capacity is su±ciently small, it may end up setting a higher threshold than college 1.
Also, greater capacity at college 2 has no e®ect whatsoever on college 1. Finally, the
students' behavior is straightforward in both cases (trivial in the costless case). As we
see below, the results are drastically di®erent when both cost and noise are present.
64 Student Portfolio Choice
Consider the student portfolio choice problem with costly applications and noisy signals.
College thresholds ¾ 1 and ¾ 2 induce acceptance chances ®1(x) and ®2(x) for every
caliber x. Taking these acceptance chances as given, each student of caliber x chooses a
portfolio of colleges to apply to. They accept the best school accepts them.
Application Sets for a Given Student. Students' optimal choice sets are:
S(x) = argmaxf0; ®1(x) ¡ c; ®2(x)u ¡ c; ®1(x) + (1 ¡ ®1(x))®2(x)u ¡ 2cg (5)
Here, ®1(x)¡c is the expected payo® of portfolio f1g, ®2(x)u¡c is the expected payo®
of f2g, and ®1(x) + (1 ¡ ®1(x))®2(x)u ¡ 2c is the expected payo® of f1;2g.
This optimization problem admits an illuminating and rigorous graphical analysis.
Consider a given student facing acceptance chances ®1 and ®2. Figure 1 depicts:
®2u = ®1 (6)
MB21 ´ (1 ¡ ®1)®2u = c (7)
MB12 ´ ®1(1 ¡ ®2u) = c; (8)
where MBij is the marginal (gross) bene¯t of adding college i to a portfolio of college j.
In Figure 1, (6) is the line ®2 = ®1=u, (7) is the concave curve ®2 = c=[u(1 ¡ ®1)], and
(8) is the convex curve ®2 = (1 ¡ c=®1)=u.
Marginal analysis reveals that, as a function of ®1 and ®2, the optimal application
strategy is given by the following rule (which follows from Chade and Smith (2006)):
(a) Apply just to college 1, if that beats applying just to college 2 or nowhere, and if
adding college 2 is then worse: ®1 ¸ maxhc;®2ui;MB21 < c ) apply to f1g
(b) Apply to both colleges if choosing just college 1 beats choosing just college 2 or
applying nowhere, and if adding college 2 is then better, or vice versa: ®1 ¸
maxhc;®2ui & MB21 ¸ c or ®2u ¸ maxhc;®1i & MB12 ¸ c ) apply to f1;2g
(c) Apply just to college 2, if that beats applying just to college 1 or nowhere, and if
adding college 1 is then worse: ®2u ¸ maxhc;®1i, MB12 < c] ) apply to f2g






























Figure 1: Optimal Decision Regions. A student applies to college 2 only in the vertical
shaded region C2; to both colleges in the hashed shaded region B; ¯nally, to college 1 only in the
horizontal shaded region C1. The dashed line acceptance relation Ã relates college acceptance
chances. In the left panel, as their caliber rises, students apply ¯rst to college 2, then both, and
then only college 1. The right panel shows non-monotone behavior, where weak students aspire
for college 1, and no one just applies to college 2. This happens here as colleges set exactly
the same thresholds, and so acceptance chances for a given caliber coincide across colleges.
Cases (a){(d) partition the unit square into regions of ®1 and ®2 that correspond to each
portfolio choice. These application regions are shaded in Figure 1.
To simplify matters and avoid uninteresting cases, we require that ®2 = c=u(1 ¡ ®1)
and ®2 = (1¡c=®1)=u cross only once in the unit square (as seen in Figure 1). Insisting
that ®2 · 1 in (7) and (8) easily yields an upper bound on costs (hereafter assumed):
c · u(1 ¡ u): (9)
The College Acceptance Relation. A higher caliber student x generates
stochastically higher signals, and so a higher acceptance chance at each college. A
monotone relation is thus induced between ®1 and ®2 across students for every pair of
thresholds ¾ 1;¾ 2. More precisely, this is constructed by inverting ®1 = 1¡G(¾ 1jx) in x,
and inserting the resulting expression in ®2 = 1 ¡ G(¾ 2jx). In particular, if ¾ 1 ¸ ¾ 2,
then the acceptance relation is piecewise linear, and is given by


















if ®1 = 0
(10)
8Application Sets Across Students. Given acceptance rates ®1(x);®2(x), the
acceptance relation implies an optimal student correspondence S(x). In a monotone
portfolio, higher caliber students apply to better schools, as in the left panel of Figure 1.
S(x) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
f1g if x ¸ »1
f1;2g if »B · x < »1
f2g if »2 · x < »B
? if 0 · x < »2
(11)
Here, the thresholds »2 < »B < »1 are implicitly de¯ned by the intersection of the
acceptance relation with c=u, ®2 = c=[u(1 ¡ ®1)], and ®2 = (1 ¡ c=®1)=u, respectively.







u¾ 2 ¡ (1 ¡ u)¾ 1 +
q
((1 ¡ u)¾ 1 + u¾ 2)






1 ¡ 4c¾ 2=(u¾ 1)
(14)
With both costs and noise present, student behavior need not be monotone in their
caliber. It is easy to construct examples in which S(x) fails to be monotone even with
¾ 1 ¸ ¾ 2. The right panel of Figure 1 provides such an example (explored in x5). In
this case, behavior is not monotone since it is possible to ¯nd a low caliber student who
applies only to college 1 and a higher caliber student that applies to both.
When is student behavior monotone? Inspecting Figure 1, a necessary and su±cient
algebraic condition for an increasing student strategy S(x) such as (11) is that the
acceptance relation crosses above the intersection (®1;®2) of (6){(8). Given ®2 = ®1=u,
this holds if and only if the college thresholds obey the following condition:
¾ 2 ·
µ
1 ¡ ¹ ®1=u
1 ¡ ¹ ®1
¶
¾ 1 ´ ´¾ 1 where ¹ ®1 = (1 ¡
p
1 ¡ 4c)=2 (15)
Since 1¡ ¹ ®1=u < 1¡ ¹ ®1, the threshold of college 2 must lie su±ciently below college 1's.
Theorem 4 produces conditions on primitives that deliver a monotone equilibrium.
95 Equilibrium Analysis
We suggestively denote the application sets, suppressing thresholds ¾ 1;¾ 2, by:
© = S
¡1(?); C2 = S
¡1(f2g); B = S
¡1(f1;2g); C1 = S
¡1(f1g)
By analogy to equations (2){(3), the enrollment at the colleges is then given by




























Given ·1 and ·2, a college equilibrium is then a pair of thresholds ¾ 1;¾ 2 that satisfy
the enrollment `market clearing' conditions ·1 = E1(¾ 1;¾ 2) and ·2 = E2(¾ 1;¾ 2).
Theorem 3 (Existence) Let c > 0. For any ·1 2 (0;1) and ·2 2 (0;·2(·1)), with
0 < ·2(·1) < 1 ¡ ·1, an equilibrium exists.
Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that set C1 is always nonempty. The capacity of
college 2 must then be bounded away from 1 ¡ ·1, since a positive measure of students
applies only to college 1. Otherwise, college 2 would be unable to ¯ll its capacity.
Theorem 3 does not assert that any equilibrium exhibits monotone behavior. For
assume both colleges use the same standard ¾e
1 = ¾e
2 = ¾e. Then the acceptance relation
(10) reduces to the `diagonal' ®2 = ®1. As ®1 > ®2u for every x, any student applying
somewhere will apply to college 1, as in Figure 1. If c < u=4, then © = [0;»0), C2 = ?,









The equations ·1 = E1(¾ 1;¾ 2) and ·2 = E2(¾ 1;¾ 2) then yield parameters for
which the resulting equilibrium fails to exhibit PAM, for any signal distribution. If it is
perturbed, the same non-monotone student behavior emerges in equilibrium for an open
set of (·1;·2). Unlike the failure of PAM for the costless case, this owes to the lack of
`monotonicity' in x of the nontrivial student portfolio optimization problem. In other
words, the best students need not even attend the colleges not only because of noise,
but also because students application strategies need not be monotone in their calibers.
10Lemma 2 (Application Thresholds)
(i) »2 is independent of ¾ 1, rises in ¾ 2, and rises in c, with limc!0 »2 = ¾ 2.
(ii) »B rises in ¾ 1, falls in ¾ 2, and rises in c, with limc!0 »B = ¾ 1.
(iii) »1 rises in ¾ 1, falls in ¾ 2, and falls in c, with limc!0 »1 = 1.
The proof in the appendix di®erentiates the closed form expressions (12){(14).
When college 1 raises its admission standards, ceteris paribus, fewer students apply to
college 1 (as »B rises) and more apply to college 2 (as »1 rises). This reallocation improves
the applicant pool at both colleges. When college 2 raises its admission standards, ceteris
paribus, fewer students apply to college 2 (as »2 rises and »1 falls) and more apply to
college 1 (as »B falls). So the applicant pool at college 2 need not improve, while the pool
for college 1 worsens as more students ¯nd it optimal to include it in their portfolios.
Let us re-write the enrollment equations (16){(17), making explicit the dependence of
Ei on the application cost c. Further substitute the monotonicity conditions, putting B[
C1 = [»B;1) into (16) and C2 = [»2;»B) and B = [»B;»1) into (17). By di®erentiation:
Lemma 3 (Enrollment) Enrollment E1 at college 1 falls in ¾ 1, rises in ¾ 2, and falls
in c, while enrollment E2 at college 2 rises in ¾ 1, falls in ¾ 2, and is ambiguous in c.
The cost comparative statics follow as students insure themselves less often when it is
more costly | the set B shrinks on both ends, as »B rises and »1 falls. This harms
enrollment at college 1. Altogether, B [C1 shrinks. The e®ect on college 2 is uncertain,
as its marginal applicant »2 also rises | so that the set C2 expands, while B shrinks.
We now impose the necessary and su±cient condition (15) for monotone student
behavior, as it depends on the endogenous variables ¾ 1 and ¾ 2, and not obviously on
the capacities. So a monotone equilibrium entails a pair of college thresholds that obey:
·1 = E1(¾ 1;¾ 2;c) (18)
·2 = E2(¾ 1;¾ 2;c) (19)
0 · ¾ 2 ·
µ
1 ¡ ¹ ®1=u
1 ¡ ¹ ®1
¶
¾ 1 (20)
Reformulate (18) and (19) as explicit functions relating the two college thresholds:
¾ 1 = H1(¾ 2;·1;c) (21)





























Figure 2: Monotone Equilibrium. The functions H1 and H2 in the left panel give pairs
of threshold levels that allow colleges 1 and 2 to ¯ll their capacities. A monotone equilibrium
obtains if H1 and H2 cross below the straight line with slope ´, from (15). The right panel
describes the range of feasible capacities ·2 for each ·1 for which a monotone equilibrium exists
| computed assuming u = 0:5, c = 0:1, and exponentially distributed calibers.
where (21) rises in ¾ 2 and falls in ·1, while (22) rises in ¾ 1 and falls in ·2. A monotone
equilibrium is then a pair (¾e
1;¾e
2) that satis¯es (20){(22).
Theorem 4 (Existence and Uniqueness) Let ·1 2 (0;1). Then there exists a cost
c(·1) > 0 and capacities 0 < ·2(·1) < ·2(·1) < 1 ¡ ·1, such that a unique monotone
equilibrium exists for all (·1;·2) 2 (0;1) £ (·2(·1);·2(·1)) and c 2 (0;c(·1)).
Figure 2 illustrates the set (0;1)£(·2(·1);·2(·1)) for which our equilibrium obtains.
For the same reason as in Theorem 3, capacity ·2 ¿ 1 ¡ ·1. For di®erent reasons,
monotonicity requires that ·2 À 0. Only `intermediate' values of ·2 are consistent with
a monotone equilibrium. For further insights, recall that equilibrium is unique in the
costless case with ¾ 1 > ¾ 2 (Theorem 2 (i)). Since (18){(20) are continuous in c, a
monotone equilibrium is unique for c su±ciently small, i.e., when c 2 (0;c(·1)).
Let Fi(xj¾e
1;¾e
2) be the cumulative distribution of calibers accepted by college i in
equilibrium, i = 1;2. In a monotone equilibrium, one would expect that the distribution
of calibers accepted by college 1 is `better' than that of college 2 in the sense of ¯rst
order stochastic dominance (FSD). We now formalize this important property of PAM:
Theorem 5 (PAM and Distribution of Types) In any monotone equilibrium, the
distribution of student calibers at college 1 is stochastically higher, in the sense of FSD.
12Changes in the model parameters ·1, ·2, and c a®ect both equilibrium student
behavior and college thresholds. The comparative statics of the model are summarized:
Theorem 6 (Equilibrium Comparative Statics)
(i) An increase in ·1 decreases both college thresholds ¾e
1 and ¾e
2.
(ii) An increase in ·2 decreases both college thresholds ¾e
1 and ¾e
2.
(iii) An increase in c decreases college threshold ¾e
1 but has an ambiguous e®ect on ¾e
2.
The ¯rst of these comparative statics seems intuitive, and it is also found in the
costless and noiseless cases (see Theorem 1 (ii) and Theorem 2 (iii)). The other two
results, however, only obtain when both cost and noise are present.
Consider the e®ects of a rising capacity of the lower ranked college 2. Given ¾ 1,
greater ·2 reduces ¾ 2, and this increases »B (Lemma 2 (ii)), and thereby pushes down
¾ 1. So the marginal caliber that was indi®erent between applying just to college 2 and
adding college 1 as well, now prefers to avoid the extra cost and applies to college 2 only.
This portfolio reallocation occasions a drop in the admission standards of college 1.
Consider now the e®ects of greater cost c. Given ¾ 1, the e®ect on ¾ 2 is ambiguous,
since »2 and »B rise while »1 falls (Lemma 2). The rise in »2 and fall in »1 shrinks the
applicant pool at college 2, but with greater »B, some students now prefer to apply
only to college 2. Notice, however, that greater c necessarily pushes down ¾ 1 (since
»B rises), which in turn decreases ¾ 2. But the net e®ect on ¾ 2 is ambiguous. As an
illustration, the decrease in mailing costs, information gathering, and online applications
have reduced the cost of applying to college. This, ceteris paribus, induces colleges to
change their admission standards, which may actually increase the probability of being
rejected by all the colleges in any given portfolio.
6 Application: Race-Based Admissions
In this section, we provide a simple application of our model to the topic of race-based
admissions policies at top schools. This issue has been particularly topical since the
Supreme Court cases Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger in which the University
of Michigan was sued for its use of race as a factor in its admissions process. The
controversy centers on whether the university's interest in promoting a diverse student





























Figure 3: Equilibrium Comparative Statics. The two functions H1 (dotted) and
H2 (dashed) are drawn, as well as the diagonal where (15) binds. This illustrates how the
equilibrium is a®ected by changing capacities ·1;·2. The left panel considers a rise in ·1,
shifting H1 left, thereby lowering both college thresholds. The right panel depicts a rise in ·2,
shifting H2 right, thereby lowering both college thresholds.
is not to provide a comprehensive treatment of this issue. Instead, we seek to provide a
few simple insights into the e®ect of these policies using our equilibrium model.
We take as our starting point a race-based admissions policy implemented at the
better college, college 1. Students of a minority group receive an additional ¢ points on
their applications, so that they are admitted if their signal ¾ is greater than ¾ 1¡¢. This
follows closely the actual undergraduate admissions policy of the University of Michigan,
which was struck down by the Supreme Court. The underlying population consists of
a proportion ½ of students from a minority group, and 1 ¡ ½ from the majority group.
The caliber distribution is identical for all population members.
Students of the minority group now have additional incentive to apply to college 1,
as for any caliber x their probability of admission at that college has increased. By
Lemma 2, »B and »1 will both fall for minority students, whereas »2 is una®ected since it
does not depend on college 1's admissions standard. The shift in the acceptance relation
for minority students is illustrated in Figure 4.
This shift in student behavior disrupts the initial equilibrium, (¾0
1;¾0
2). After the
introduction of the policy, applications to college 1 from minority students will increase,
and this leads to an increase in its admissions threshold. This e®ect is depicted in the
left panel of Figure 5 by a rightward shift in the H
¡1
1 function. Yet the increase in










Figure 4: Student Behavior with Race Based Admissions. With the introduction
of a race based admissions policy, students in the minority group are more likely to get into
college 1 than before. As a result, their acceptance relation shifts downward. Their new
acceptance relation is indicated by the dotted line, while the old one is dashed. Note that
minority students start applying to college 1 at lower calibers than was previously the case.
initially. Hence the policy raises the admissions standard at college 1 for members of the
majority group, and lowers it for those in the minority. The size of the e®ect depends on
the fraction of minority students in the population: for ½ low, the shift in H
¡1
1 will be
small and the new threshold ¾1
1 will only be marginally higher. This means that ¾1
1¡¢
will be close to ¾0
1 ¡ ¢, and thus the minority group will receive the full bene¯t of the
policy. By contrast, for ½ high, the admissions standard will increase markedly, and the
new threshold for the minority group will not be that much lower. Moreover, that for
members of the majority group will be considerably higher.
To complete the analysis, we note that college 2 must similarly drop its admissions
threshold relative to before, as it is losing minority applicants to college 1. This is shown
in the right panel of Figure 5 by a downward shift in the H2 function. Yet since college
1 is simultaneously raising its applications threshold, thereby raising demand for places
at college 2 from students of the majority group, the overall e®ect on the applications
threshold of college 2 is unclear. We summarize our results in a proposition:
Theorem 7 (Race-Based Admissions) Consider a monotone equilibrium and let






















Figure 5: Equilibrium under Race Based Admissions The left panel shows the
e®ect of increased applications by minority students to college 1. The H¡1
1 functions shifts
rightwards, intersecting H2 at a higher level of both ¾ 1 and ¾ 2. The right panel shows the
rightward shift of H2 that results from college 2 losing minority applicants. The equilibrium
shifts from E0 to E1, with a clear increase in the applications threshold at college 1, but an
ambiguous e®ect on the applications threshold of college 2.
(i) The proportion of minority students at college 1 increases, and at college 2 falls;
(ii) The new threshold set by college 1 is higher, and is increasing in ½;
(iii) The new threshold set by college 2 is the same as the old one.
These results provide some novel insights into the e®ects of these policies. The ¯rst
is that there is an implicit tradeo® between the level of diversity across colleges. Mak-
ing one college more diverse by attracting and admitting minority applicants through a
race-based admissions policy must in turn limit the fraction of minority applicants at
other schools. Moreover, these minority applicants may have less chance of being ad-
mitted at other schools as they are crowded out by strong majority applicants who were
discouraged from applying to the college with the race-based admissions policy. This
will be the case when the minority group is a small fraction of the population. So even
if achieving diversity across colleges is considered an appropriate aim, there is a need to
be sure that the schools that implement it are less diverse than their competitors.
The second insight relates to the composition of the student body at college 1. The
policy allows weaker students from the minority group admission into the school. But
it also restricts enrollment to stronger applicants from the majority group, and thus the
e®ects on the average caliber of students in the school are unclear. To the extent that
there are bene¯ts to having a diverse student body, these bene¯ts will be experienced
16by all. The question then becomes whether the caliber of the learning experience is
dependent on the average caliber the student body, or is shaped by the weakest caliber
in the student population. If the former, there is no real tradeo® and the policy is good
for college 1; while if the latter, the e®ects of the policy are more tricky to pin down.
7 Di®erent Signals of Caliber
7.1 Conditionally iid MLRP Signals
For simplicity, we have derived all the results under the assumption that the conditional
distribution of the signal for a student of caliber x is uniform on [0;x]. We now show
that all the results extend to a large class of signal distributions with the MLRP.
Let g(¾jx) be a continuous density function that satis¯es the MLRP, with ¾ 2 [¾; ¹ ¾],
¡1 · ¾ < ¹ ¾ · 1, x 2 [x;1), and x ¸ ¡1. Let G(¾jx) be its cdf, which is assumed
to be twice di®erentiable in x. Since G is monotone in each variable, we can take the
inverse function with respect to each of them. We shall denote by ' the inverse of G
with respect to x, and by Á the corresponding one with respect to ¾.
Inverting ®1(x) = 1¡G(¾ 1jx) with respect to x and inserting the resulting expression
in ®2(x) = 1 ¡ G(¾ 2jx) yields the following acceptance relation:
®2 = Ã(¾ 1;¾ 2;®1) ´ 1 ¡ G(¾ 2j'(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1)): (23)
Inspired by the properties of the acceptance relation in the uniform case, we shall
impose the following assumptions on (23): (a) Ã is increasing in ®1; (b) Ã(0;¾ 1;¾ 2) ¸ 0,
Ã(1;¾ 1;¾ 2) = 1, and 0 < Ã < 1 for all ®1 2 (0;1); (c) Ã is concave in ®1 if ¾ 1 ¸ ¾ 2.
Under these conditions, we get an acceptance relation of the form depicted in Figure 6.
The following result provides a set of su±cient conditions on the family of signal
distributions that engender properties (a), (b), and (c).
Lemma 4 (Signal Distributions) Ã(¾ 1;¾ 2;®1) satis¯es (a), (b), and (c), if:
(i) g(¾jx) satis¯es MLRP;
(ii) For all interior ¾ and x, G(¾jx) > 0, limx!x G(¾jx) = 1 and limx!1 G(¾jx) = 0;
(iii) ¡Gx(¾jx) is log-supermodular in (¾;x).









Figure 6: Concave acceptance relation. The ¯gure depicts an example of an acceptance
relation that satis¯es conditions (a), (b), and (c), for which student behavior is monotone.
MLRP implies property (a), while (ii) yields the boundary conditions embedded in (b).
In turn, log-supermodularity of ¡Gx ensures the concavity property asserted in (c).
We will henceforth assume (i), (ii), and (iii). To be sure, this de¯nes a large
class of signal distributions. One can easily show that it includes the location families
G(¾jx) = G(¾ ¡ x) (e.g., normal), the scale families G(¾jx) = G(¾=x) (e.g., uniform
and exponential), and also the oft-used in applications power family G(¾jx) = G(¾)x.
Careful inspection of the proofs of Theorems 1{3 reveal that they only make use
of properties (a) and (b) of the uniform distribution, and thus they readily extend to
the class of signal distributions de¯ned in Lemma 4. Also, the construction of the
non-monotone equilibrium was independent of the signal distribution.
Notice that extension of Lemma 2 implies that of Lemma 3, since its proof does not
depend on the uniform distribution. Similarly, extension of Theorem 4 implies that of
Theorems 5 and 6, and Proposition 7, for their proofs do not depend on the uniform
distribution either. Thus, it only remains to extend Lemma 2 and Theorem 4. The
details can be found in the Appendix, but here is an overview of the main issues.
Regarding Lemma 2, the only problem that arises is that »B need not be unique,
as it is de¯ned by the solution of the acceptance relation (23) and the marginal bene¯t
function (8), both of which are concave functions. We show that the following condition
18on the information structure is su±cient (but by no means necessary) for »B to be
unique for c su±ciently small: If ¾ 1 ¸ ¾ 2 > ¾, then
lim
x!x
(1 ¡ G(¾ 1jx))Gx(¾ 2jx)=Gx(¾ 1jx) = 0: (24)
This is a relatively mild condition that is satis¯ed by most of the aforementioned exam-
ples (e.g., uniform, exponential, and product family).
Regarding Theorem 4, the analog to condition (15) in this case is:




which is equivalent to
¾ 2 · Á(1 ¡
1
u
®1;'(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1)): (25)
This condition is now necessary but not su±cient for monotone behavior, since we also
need to ensure that »B is unique. It is easy to show that the right side of (25) is increasing
in ¾ 1, strictly less than ¾ 1 for all c > 0, and converges to ¾ 1 as c vanishes.5
Assuming that »B is unique, a monotone equilibrium is a pair of college thresholds
that satisfy equations (18) and (19) (with G(¾ ijx) instead of ¾ i=x, i = 1;2), as well as
condition (25). We show that if the signal distribution satis¯es (24), then the existence
part of Theorem 4 holds. The uniqueness part holds if, in addition, it satis¯es the
following condition: If ¾ 1 ¸ ¾ 2 > ¾, then
lim
x!x
(1 ¡ G(¾ 1jx))g(¾ 2jx)=Gx(¾ 1jx) = 0: (26)
Like (24), condition (26) is also satis¯ed by most of the examples mentioned above.6
In short, all the insights extend to a large class of information structures that satisfy
MLRP plus some regularity conditions. The role of the latter is simply to ensure that
student behavior will be monotone when college behavior is monotone.
5For example, in the location families with x = ¡1, ¾ = ¡1, and ¾ = 1, the right side of (25)
becomes ¾ 1 ¡
¡
G¡1(1 ¡ ®1) ¡ G¡1(1 ¡ ®1=u)
¢






¾ 1 if g(¾jx) = 1
xe¡¾=x,
x = ¾ = 0, and ¾ = 1. It is straightforward to check the aforementioned properties.
6Notice that (24) and (26) are satis¯ed if Gx(¾jx) 6= 0 and ¯nite for all ¾ > ¾, as in G(¾jx) = G(¾)x.
197.2 Perfectly Correlated Signals
So far we have assumed that if a student of caliber x applies to both colleges, they
observe independent signals drawn from g(¾jx). We now study the polar case in which
the signals observed by the colleges are perfectly (positively) correlated (i.e., both observe
the same realization). For simplicity, we present the main results assuming that signals
are uniformly distributed, and then sketch their straightforward generalization to the
class of signal distributions of Lemma 4. The key feature of this case is that if a student
is accepted at the more selective college, then he is also accepted at the less selective
one. This immediately implies that ¾ 1 > ¾ 2 in equilibrium, for otherwise nobody would
apply to college 2. That is, in any equilibrium college behavior must be monotone.
The expected utility of applying to just one college is ®1(x) ¡ c and ®2(x)u ¡ c,
respectively. Since ¾ 1 > ¾ 2, applying to both yields ®1(x) + (®2(x) ¡ ®1(x))u ¡ 2c.
Thus, the student's optimal strategy is characterized by the following conditions:
®2u = ®1
MB21 ´ (®2 ¡ ®1)u = c
MB12 ´ ®1(1 ¡ u) = c:
Graphically, the following straight lines delimit the regions of the student's application
strategy: ®1 = c=(1 ¡ u), ®2 = ®1 + c=u, ®2 = ®1=u, ®1 = c, and ®2 = c=u. Since the
acceptance relation (10) is also linear, student optimal behavior is always monotone. To
avoid the trivial case without multiple applications, we impose the condition that the
acceptance relation crosses above the point (^ ®1; ^ ®2) = (c=(1¡u);c=u(1¡u)). This yields
¾ 2 ·
µ
1 ¡ c=u(1 ¡ u)
1 ¡ c=(1 ¡ u)
¶
¾ 1: (27)
































Figure 7: Student Behavior with perfectly correlated signals. With perfectly
correlated signals, we get di®erent acceptance regions from those in the independent case.
Notice that these thresholds satisfy all the properties stated in Lemma 2 except for one:
»B does not depend ¾ 2. This dramatically simpli¯es the equilibrium analysis, for it
makes the determination of the acceptance threshold ¾ 1 independent of ¾ 2.
A monotone equilibrium is a pair of college thresholds that satis¯es:
·1 = E1(¾ 1) (28)
·2 = E2(¾ 1;¾ 2) (29)
0 · ¾ 2 ·
µ
1 ¡ c=u(1 ¡ u)


















Z »1(¾ 1;¾ 2)
»B(¾ 1)
¾ 1 ¡ ¾ 2
x
f(x)dx
Equations (28){(29) de¯ne, implicitly, the functions ¾ 1 = H1(·1) and ¾ 2 = H2(¾ 1;·2).
Theorem 8 (Perfectly Correlated Signals) Let ·1 2 (0;1) and c < u(1 ¡ u).
21(i) There is an interval (·2(·1);·2(·1)), with 0 < ·2(·1) < ·2(·1) < 1 ¡ ·1, such
that, for all (·1;·2) 2 (0;1) £ (·2(·1);·2(·1)), a unique equilibrium exists.
(ii) The comparative static properties with respect to ·1 and c are the same as in
Theorem 6, while an increase in ·2 reduces ¾e
2 but has no e®ect on ¾e
1.
Notice that an increase in the capacity of college 2 has no e®ect on the acceptance thresh-
old of college 1. This is because the marginal bene¯t of adding college 1 to a portfolio
that already contains college 2 is independent of ¾ 2. Thus, »B, which determines the
caliber above which students apply to college 1, does not depend on ¾ 2 either, thereby
insulating college 1's applicant pool from the acceptance decisions of college 2 (i.e., the
H
¡1
1 function is a `vertical' line). But this result only holds in the perfectly correlated
case and hence it is not robust. To see this, note that in the conditional independent
case MB12 = ®1 ¡ ®1®2u; i.e., adding college 1 increases expected utility by ®1 but it
decreases it by ®1®2u, since acceptance by college 1 has an `opportunity cost' of ®2u.
In the perfectly correlated case, that opportunity cost is equal to u, as the probability
of being accepted at college 2 conditional on being accepted at college 1 is equal to one,
and thus it is independent of ¾ 2. But if correlation is less than perfect, this conditional
probability is less than one and depends on ¾ 2. Therefore, »B will depend on ¾ 2 as
well. Graphically, this means that the slope of H
¡1
1 will be positive but less than in¯nity
unless the signals of a student observed by colleges are perfectly correlated.
Proposition 8 easily extends to the class of g(¾jx) of Lemma 4; just replace (27) by
¾ 2 · Á(1 ¡ c=u(1 ¡ u);'(1 ¡ c=(1 ¡ u);¾ 1)): (31)
The only additional insight that emerges in the general case is that, if Ã is strictly
concave, then there exists nonmonotone equilibria when condition (31) does not hold.
8 Conclusion
Assume, simply for the sake of argument, that Harvard is indeed the best college. Does
that mean that Harvard attracts the best students to apply to it? When the University
of Chicago increased the size of its college by a third, what should we expect were the
e®ects on its student caliber, or on other competing colleges? What are the e®ects of
the recent advances in technology that have reduced college application costs? How do
22race-based admissions policies a®ect student body composition? These are some of the
issues this paper has been designed to answer, in an extremely stylized environment.
We have provided an intuitive graphical solution to the nontrivial student portfolio
choice problem, which clearly illustrates the lack of a natural single crossing property to
guarantee monotone behavior as a function of calibers. We have also explored assortive
matching in this context, showing that it arises provided the application cost is small
and the capacity of the lesser college is neither too large nor too small. We have shown
that there are also equilibria that are non-monotone; surprisingly, they exist even when
the better college sets a higher admission threshold than the lesser college. We have
provided equilibrium comparative static results with respect to college capacities and
application cost. Crucially, we have shown that noisy signals and student application
costs introduce an externality of the worse-ranked college upon the better one. This only
arises when both noise and cost are present, for it is driven by the subtle student portfolio
reallocation that ensues when a parameter changes. We have shown the robustness of our
main results by generalizing our model to a large class of signal distributions, explored
the case with correlated signals, and provided a foundation for our reduced-form model
of college behavior (see Appendix). Finally, we have presented an application to the
case of race-based admissions, and showcased some of the tradeo®s that arise there.
There are many natural avenues for future research. Obviously, as we have pro-
ceeded with just two colleges, this does not realistically capture the far richer world.
Also, college caliber is in the long-term endogenously determined by the caliber of stu-
dents attending. Finally, we have assumed that student preferences are homogeneous.
In Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2005) we allow for heterogenous preferences and investi-
gate | theoretically and empirically | the informational content of several equilibrium
statistics (e.g., acceptance rates, yields, etc.) that are commonly used as a basis for the
construction of college rankings.
23A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 (Noiseless Case)
(i) We can solve (1) sequentially as follows. For any ·1 2 (0;1), there is a unique ¾e
1
that solves the ·1 equation in (1), which is independent of ¾ 2 and is decreasing in ·1.
Inserting this solution in the ·2 equation, we ¯nd that the right side is decreasing in ¾ 2,
and its maximum value is equal to
R ¾e
1
0 f(x)dx = 1 ¡ ·1. Thus, if ·2 2 (0;1 ¡ ·1), then
there is a unique ¾e
2 that solves the second equality in (1). Hence, there is a unique pair
(¾e
1;¾e
2) that solves both equations in (1).
(ii) Notice that equations (1) do not depend on c. Next, di®erentiate (1). ¤
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 (Costless Case)
(i) We can solve (2){(3) sequentially as follows. For any ·1 2 (0;1), there is a unique ¾e
1
that solves equation (2), which is independent of ¾ 2 and is decreasing in ·1. Inserting
this solution in equation (3), we ¯nd that the right side is decreasing in ¾ 2, and its









x f(x)dx = 1¡·1.
Since the largest value ¾ 2 can assume in this case is ¾e
1, it follows that the smallest









x )f(x)dx. Call this value
·2(·1). Then, if ·2 2 (·2(·1);1¡·1), there is a unique ¾e
2 that solves (3). Hence, there
is a unique pair of college thresholds (¾e
1;¾e
2) that solves (2){(3).
(ii) Let ·1 2 (0;1). Proceeding as in (i) and inserting the unique solution ¾e
1 of (2) in (4),
it follows that there is a unique solution ¾e
2, with ¾e
1 < ¾e
2, so long as ·2 2 (0;·2(·1)).
(iii) Notice that equations (2){(3) (and (4)) do not depend on c. The rest follows by
straightforward di®erentiation of equations (2) and (3) (or (4)). ¤
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3 (Equilibrium Existence)
The enrollment functions have the following properties: (a) E1(0;¾ 2) = 1; (b) E1(1;¾ 2) =
0 8¾ 2; (c) E2(¾ 1;1) = 0 8¾ 1; (d) E1 is decreasing in ¾ 1 and increasing in ¾ 2; (e) E2
is increasing in ¾ 1 and decreasing in ¾ 2. Now, (a);(b) and (d) imply that there exists
a unique ¾ 1 for any ·1 such that E1(¾ 1;¾ 2) = ·1. To get a similar existence statement
for E2(¾ 1;¾ 2) we must bound ¾ 1 away from 0 (otherwise college 2 will be unable to ¯ll
its capacity). Let ¾L
1(·2) be de¯ned by E2(¾L
1;0) = ·2. Then by (e) for ¾ 1 ¸ ¾L
1(·2)
24there exists a unique ¾ 2 ¸ 0 such that E2(¾ 1;¾ 2) = ·2. But since we restrict college 1
to a threshold of at least ¾L
1(·2), it is clear that it cannot have `large capacity.' More
precisely, let ·H
1 (·2) = E1(¾L
1(·2);0). Then for any ·1 · ·H
1 (·2), there will be a unique
solution for ¾ 1, with ¾ 1 ¸ ¾L
1(·2) for all ¾ 2. We may show that this restriction on ·1
is equivalent to requiring ·2 to be less than ¹ ·2(·1) for ¹ ·2(·1) = E2(H1(0;·1);0).
Note that the colleges cannot set thresholds above a certain level. Certainly, college
1 cannot set a threshold higher than ¾H
1, where ¾H




for the set of calibers applying to college 1 is a subset of [0;1). Similarly, we de¯ne ¾H
2.




which is compact, convex and nonempty. De¯ne a vector-valued function T : S ! S by
T(¾ 1;¾ 2) = (~ ¾ 1; ~ ¾ 2), where ~ ¾ 1 satis¯es E1(~ ¾ 1;¾ 2) = ·1 and ~ ¾ 2 satis¯es E2(¾ 1; ~ ¾ 2) =
·2. T is well-de¯ned on S, as shown by the earlier analysis. Further, T is continuous, as
the demand functions are continuous in both arguments. The latter follows since the cal-
iber distribution is atomless, and both the application sets and acceptance probabilities
are smooth functions of the thresholds. Thus we may apply Brouwer's ¯xed point theo-
rem to deduce that T has a ¯xed point | which immediately satis¯es ·1 = E1(¾ 1;¾ 2)
and ·2 = E2(¾ 1;¾ 2). ¤
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1 (Thresholds for Monotone Strategies)
The threshold »2 solves ®2(»2) = c=u, which immediately yields (12).
Threshold »B is derived in two steps. We ¯rst ¯nd the value of ®1 at which the
acceptance relation ®2 = Ã(¾ 1;¾ 2;®1) intersects ®2 = (1 ¡c=®1)=u. Call this value ^ ®1,

















Given ^ ®1, we then ¯nd »B as ^ ®1 = 1 ¡ G(¾ 1j»B), which yields »B = ¾ 1=(1 ¡ ^ ®1).
Expression (13) follows by simple algebraic manipulation.
Finally, »1 is obtained as follows. We ¯rst ¯nd the value of ®1 at which the acceptance
relation ®2 = Ã(¾ 1;¾ 2;®1) intersects ®2 = c=(1¡®1)u. Call this value ~ ®1, which is the












Given ~ ®1, we then ¯nd »1 as ~ ®1 = 1¡G(¾ 1j»1), which yields »1 = ¾ 1=(1¡~ ®1). Expression
(14) follows by simple algebraic manipulation.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2 (Monotone Student Behavior)
Since the proof amounts to straightforward and tedious di®erentiation and limit-taking
of the closed form expressions (12){(14), we shall prove parts (ii) and (iii) in a way that
generalizes beyond the uniform distribution. Firstly, (i) is obvious from (12)
(ii) Notice that ^ ®1 satis¯es
^ ®1 =
c
1 ¡ uÃ(¾ 1;¾ 2; ^ ®1)
: (32)
Denote the right side of (32) by z(^ ®1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2). It is easy to show that
0 < z(0;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2) < z(1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2) < 1;
z(^ ®1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2) is strictly increasing in ^ ®1 and, under the uniform distribution, it
is also strictly convex in ^ ®1. Thus, there is a unique ^ ®1 that satis¯es (32). Moreover,
z(^ ®1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2) decreases ¾ 2, increases in c and ¾ 1, and converges to zero as c vanishes.
Hence, ^ ®1 exhibits this behavior as well. Since »B = ¾ 1=(1 ¡ ^ ®1), the properties stated
in part (ii) now follow easily.
(iii) Notice that ~ ®1 satis¯es
~ ®1 = 1 ¡
c
uÃ(¾ 1;¾ 2; ~ ®1)
: (33)
Denote the right side of (33) by r(~ ®1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2). It is easy to show that (recall (15))
®1 < r(®1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2) < r(1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2) < 1;
r(~ ®1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2) is strictly increasing in ~ ®1 and, since Ã is concave in ~ ®1 under the
uniform distribution, r(~ ®1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2) is also strictly concave in ^ ®1. Thus, there is
26a unique ~ ®1 2 (®1;1) that satis¯es (33). Moreover, r(~ ®1;c;u;¾ 1;¾ 2) decreases in c
and ¾ 2, increases in ¾ 1, and converges to one as c vanishes. Hence, ~ ®1 exhibits these
properties as well. Since »1 = ¾ 1=(1 ¡ ~ ®1), part (iii) is now straightforward. ¤
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4 (Monotone Equilibrium)





. We shall denote by (^ ¾1; ^ ¾2) the unique
solution to ·1 = E1(¾ 1;¾ 2;c) and ¾ 2 = ´¾ 1. Obviously, (^ ¾1; ^ ¾2) depend on ·1 and c.
Existence. To prove existence, we proceed in four steps. First, we show that there is
an interval of ·2 such that the value of ¾ 1 at which H2(¾ 1;·2;c) = 0 is less than the
value of ¾ 1 at which ¾ 1 = H1(0;·2;c). Second, we show that there exists an interval
of ·2 such that, at ^ ¾1, H2(^ ¾1;·2;c) < ^ ¾2. Third, we prove that if c is su±ciently small,
then the intersection of the aforementioned intervals is nonempty. Fourth, we use the
continuity of the functions H1 and H2 to complete the existence proof.
Step 1: There is an interval of ·2 such that H
¡1
2 (0;·2) < H1(0;·1).
To see this, note ¯rst that ¾ 1 = H1(0;·1;c) is the unique solution to ·1 = E1(¾ 1;0;c).
Also, it is easy to show that, at ¾ 2 = 0, »2 = 0, »B = ¾ 1=(1¡c=(1¡u)), and »1 = ¾ 1u=c.













Since E2(0;0;c) = 0 and @E2=@¾ 1 > 0, it follows that if ·2 2 (0;E2(H1(0;·1;c);0;c)),
then the unique solution to (34) satis¯es H
¡1
2 (0;·2;c) < H1(0;·1;c).
Step 2: There is an interval of ·2 such that H2(^ ¾1;·2;c) < ^ ¾2 = ´^ ¾1.
Since @E2=@¾ 2 < 0, it follows that if ·2 2 (E2(^ ¾1; ^ ¾2;c);E2(^ ¾1;0;c)), then the unique ¾ 2
that solves ·2 = E2(^ ¾1;¾ 2;c) belongs to the interval (0; ^ ¾2), and thus H2(^ ¾1;·2;c) < ^ ¾2.
Step 3: For c small, the intersection of the two intervals of ·2 is an interval.
We will show that E2(^ ¾1; ^ ¾2;c) < E2(H1(0;·1;c);0;c)) for c > 0 su±ciently small. Let
us write ^ ¾1(·1;c) and ^ ¾2(·1;c) to emphasize their (continuous) dependence on ·1 and
c. Since ®1 = (1¡
p
1 ¡ 4c)=2, limc!0 ®1 = 0 and thus ^ ¾2(·1;0) = ^ ¾1(·1;0). Notice also
that ·1 = E1(^ ¾1(·1;0); ^ ¾1(·1;0);0) implies that ^ ¾1(·1;0) > 0, as E1(0;¾ 2;c) = 1 > ·1.
Moreover, H1(0;·1;0) = ^ ¾1(·1;0), for »B is equal to ¾ 1 at c = 0 (Lemma 2 (ii)) and
27thus is independent of ¾ 2.7 Using these results and Lemma 2, it follows that
lim
c!0




















Thus, E2(^ ¾1(·1;0); ^ ¾2(·1;0);0) < E2(^ ¾1(·1;0);0;0). By continuity, E2(^ ¾1; ^ ¾2;c) <
E2(H1(0;·1;c);0;c)) for c > 0 su±ciently small.
Step 4: Given ·1, an equilibrium exists for an interval of c and an interval of ·2.
De¯ne ·2(·1) ´ E2(^ ¾1; ^ ¾2;c) and ·2(·1) ´ E2(H1(0;·1;c);0;c). Thus far we have shown
that if c 2 (0;c0(·1)) and ·2 2 (·2(·1);·2(·1)), then H
¡1
2 (0;·2) < H1(0;·1) (Step 1)
and H2(^ ¾1;·2;c) < H¡1(^ ¾1;·1;c) (Step 2 plus the de¯nition of ^ ¾1). In words, within the
set of (¾ 1;¾ 2) such that 0 · ¾ 2 · ´¾ 1, the function ¾ 2 = H
¡1
1 (¾ 1;·1;c) lies `below'
the function ¾ 2 = H2(¾ 1;·2;c) for low values of ¾ 1 (Step 1) and `above' when ¾ 1 = ^ ¾1.




Uniqueness. We now show that if ·2 2 (·2(·1);·2(·1)) and c is small, then the slope
of ¾ 2 = H2(¾ 1;·2;c) is smaller than that of ¾ 2 = H
¡1
1 (¾ 1;·1;c), thereby implying that
the equilibrium is unique. Formally, we need to show that @H1=@¾ 2 £@H2=@¾ 1 < 1, or
@E1=@¾ 1 £ @E2=@¾ 2 ¡ @E1=@¾ 2 £ @E2=@¾ 1 > 0: (35)
Di®erentiation of expressions (12){(14) and (16){(17) yields after tedious algebra
lim
c!0




































Hence, (35) holds at c = 0. By continuity, the result also holds for c 2 (0;c1(·1)).
7Graphically, ¾ 2 = H
¡1
1 (¾ 1;·1;c) becomes a `vertical line' as c goes to zero; recall the costless case.
28Let c(·1) = minfc0(·1);c1(·1)g. Given ·1 2 (0;1), we have thus proved that there
is a unique monotone equilibrium (¾e
1;¾e
2) if ·2 2 (·2(·1);·2(·1)) and c 2 (0;c(·1)). ¤
A.7 Proof of Theorem 5 (Types under PAM)
Let f1(x) and f2(x) be the densities of calibers accepted at colleges 1 and 2, respectively,
where we have omitted (¾e
1;¾e










»B ®2(s)(1 ¡ ®1(s))f(s)ds
I[»2;»1](x);(37)
where IA is the indicator function of the set A.
We shall show that, if xL;xH 2 [0;1), with xH > xL, then f1(xH)f2(xL) ¸
f2(xH)f1(xL); i.e., fi(x) is log-supermodular in (¡i;x), or it satis¯es MLRP. Since MLRP
of the densities implies that the cdfs are ordered by FSD, the theorem follows.
Using (36) and (37), f1(xH)f2(xL) ¸ f2(xH)f1(xL) is equivalent to
®1HI[»B;1)(xH)
¡









where ®ij = ®i(xj), i = 1;2, j = L;H. It is easy to show that the only nontrivial case
to consider is when xL;xH 2 [»B;»1] (in all the other cases, either both sides are zero,
or only the right side is). If xL;xH 2 [»B;»1], then (38) becomes ®1H®2L(1 ¡ ®1L) ¸
®1L®2H(1 ¡ ®1H), or
(1 ¡ G(¾ 1 j xH))(1 ¡ G(¾ 2 j xL))G(¾ 1 j xL) ¸
(1 ¡ G(¾ 1 j xL))(1 ¡ G(¾ 2 j xH))G(¾ 1 j xH):
(39)
Since g(¾ j x) satis¯es MLRP, it follows that (i) G(¾ j x) is decreasing in x, and hence
G(¾ 1 j xL) ¸ G(¾ 1 j xH); (ii) 1 ¡ G(¾ j x) is log-supermodular in (x;¾), and therefore
(1 ¡ G(¾ 1 j xH))(1 ¡ G(¾ 2 j xL)) ¸ (1 ¡ G(¾ 1 j xL))(1 ¡ G(¾ 2 j xH)), for ¾ 1 > ¾ 2
in a monotone equilibrium. Thus, (39) is satis¯ed, thereby proving that fi(x) is log-
supermodular, which in turn implies that F1 dominates F2 is the sense of FSD. ¤
29A.8 Proof of Theorem 6 (Comparative Statics)
(i) In equilibrium, ·1 = E1(¾e
1;¾e
2;c) and ·2 = E2(¾e
1;¾e
2;c). Di®erentiating this system
























2 > 0 (see Theorem 4).
(ii) Di®erentiating ·1 = E1(¾e
1;¾e
2;c) and ·2 = E2(¾e
1;¾e




















where ¢ = @E1=@¾e
1 £ @E2=@¾e
2 > 0.
(iii) Di®erentiating ·1 = E1(¾e
1;¾e
2;c) and ·2 = E2(¾e
1;¾e



































To see this, notice that the numerator of @¾e


















































In turn, the numerator of @¾e













































































thereby revealing that the sign of @¾e
2=@c is ambiguous. ¤
A.9 Proof of Theorem 7 (Race Based Admissions)
Let Em
i (¾ 1 ¡ ¢;¾ 2) be the minority students enrollment at college i, and EM
i (¾ 1;¾ 2)



























To analyze the e®ects of introducing ¢, we will analyze the equilibrium comparative
static with respect to ¢ evaluated at ¢ = 0. Notice that, at ¢ = 0, Em
i = EM
i , i = 1;2,
and the same is true with their derivatives.
(i) Note that, with the introduction of ¢, »B and »1 fall for minority students. Since
(»B;1) and (»2;»1) are, respectively, the sets of minority students calibers applying to
college 1 and to college 2, it follows that more of them now apply to college 1 and fewer
to college 2. Moreover, each minority student from the original equilibrium now has a
higher chance of getting into college 1, and the same chance of getting into school 2 as
their majority counterparts. Combining these e®ects (i.e. the application sets and the
acceptance probabilities), the result follows.
(ii) Di®erentiating (40){(41) with respect to ¢, and evaluating the resulting expressions
at ¢ = 0 yields @¾e
1=@¢ = ½, which is positive, less than one, and increasing in ½.
(iii) Proceeding as in (ii), we obtain that, evaluated at ¢ = 0, @¾e
2=@¢ = 0. ¤
31A.10 Proof of Lemma 4 (MLRP Families)
(a) Ã is increasing in ®1, for
@Ã
@®1
= Gx(¾ 2jÁ(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1))=Gx(¾ 2jÁ(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1));
and MLRP implies that Gx < 0.
(b) 0 < Ã < 1 for all ®1 2 (0;1) follows from G(¾jx) > 0 for every interior ¾, x <
Á(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1) < 1, and ¾ 1 ¸ ¾ 2. To show that Ã(0;¾ 1;¾ 2) ¸ 0, notice that Ã is
positive, single-valued, and continuous for all ®1 2 (0;1). Finally, limx!1 G(¾jx) = 0
implies that lim®1!1 Á(1¡®1;¾ 1) = 1, and thus Ã(1;¾ 1;¾ 2) = limx!1 1¡G(¾ 2jx) = 1.





Gx(¾ 2j'(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1))
Gx(¾ 1j'(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1))2
µ
Gxx(¾ 1j'(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1))
Gx(¾ 1j'(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1))
¡
Gxx(¾ 2j'(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1))
Gx(¾ 2j'(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1))
¶
;
and this derivative is nonpositive if the expression in parenthesis is nonnegative. A
su±cient condition for this to hold is that Gxx(¾jx)=Gx(¾jx) be increasing in ¾ or,
equivalently, that ¡Gx(¾jx) be log-supermodular. ¤
A.11 Proof of Theorem 8 (Correlated Signals)
(i) It is easy to show that
@E1
@¾ 1 < 0,
@E2
@¾ 2 < 0, and
@E2






. Then there exists a unique ¾e
1 that solves (28), which is decreasing
in ·1 and independent of ¾ 2. Inserting this solution in equation (29), we ¯nd that the
right side is decreasing in ¾ 2, and its maximum value | i.e., when ¾ 2 = 0 | is equal
to E2(¾e
1;0). Call this value ·2(·1). Since the largest value ¾ 2 can assume in this case
is ¸¾e
1, it follows that the smallest feasible value of the right side of (29) is equal to
E2(¾e
1;¸¾e
1). Call this value ·2(·1). Then, if ·2 2 (·2(·1);·2(·1)), there is a unique ¾e
2
that solves (29). Hence, there is a unique pair of college thresholds (¾e
1;¾e
2) that solves
(28){(30). It is straightforward to check that 0 < ·2(·1) < ·2(·1) < 1 ¡ ·1.
(ii) In equilibrium, ·1 = E1(¾e
1;c) and ·2 = E2(¾e
1;¾e
2;c). Di®erentiating this system

































where ¢ = @E1=@¾e
1 £ @E2=@¾e




























since @E1=@c < 0 but the sign of @E2=@c is ambiguous. ¤
B Appendix: General Signal Structure and PAM
Let xu(¾ i) = maxfx 2 [x;1)jG(¾ ijx) = 1g, i = 1;2 (e.g., in the uniform, xu(¾ i) = ¾ i).
Consider the extension of Lemma 2. Part (i) follows easily, since ®2(»2) = c=u
implies that »2 = Á(1 ¡ c=u;¾ 2), which is increasing in c and in ¾ 2. Moreover, since
»2 2 [xu(¾ 2);1) and is continuous in c, limc!0 »2 = xu(¾ 2). The proof of part (iii) is
exactly the same as before, except that now »1 = Á(1 ¡ ~ ®;¾ 1). Regarding part (ii), the
problem in the general case is that, although there is a solution ^ ®1 to equation (32) with
the properties stated in the proof, it need not be unique. Hence, »B = Á(1¡ ^ ®1;¾ 1) need
not be unique either. It is clear from (32) that a su±cient condition for uniqueness is









where we have omitted the arguments of the functions to simplify the notation. Now, as
c vanishes, the denominator converges to a positive number, and the numerator vanishes
if ^ ®1@ª=@®1 goes to zero. But this is equivalent to
lim
c!0




Since »B 2 [xu(¾ 1);1) and is continuous in c, it follows that limc!0 »B = xu(¾ 1) ¸ x.
33Thus, a su±cient condition for (42) is that condition (26) holds. Hence, »B is unique for
an interval of c > 0 su±ciently small. The rest of the proof of (ii) is the same as before.
Let us turn now to Theorem 4. Assume for a moment that »B is unique.
As regards to existence, the proof goes through with the following minor modi¯ca-
tions. In Step 1, replace ¾ 2 = 0 by ¾ 2 = ¾, ¾ 1=x by G(¾ 1jx), and use »2 = x, »B =
Á(1¡c=u;¾ 1), and »1 = Á(c=u;¾ 1). In Step 2, replace ´¾ 1 by Á(1¡ 1
u®1;'(1¡®1;¾ 1)),
and 0 by ¾. In Step 3, replace ¾ i = 0 (whenever it appear) by ¾ i = ¾, i = 1;2; replace
»B = ¾ 1 at c = 0 by »B = xu(¾ 1) at c = 0, and
^ ¾1(·1;0)
x by G(^ ¾1(·1;0)jx). Finally, in
Step 4, replace 0 by ¾ inside E2, H1, and H
¡1
2 , and ´¾ 1 by Á(1 ¡ 1
u®1;'(1 ¡ ®1;¾ 1)).
Regarding uniqueness, di®erentiation of »1 = Á(1 ¡ ~ ®;¾ 1) and »B = Á(1 ¡ ^ ®1;¾ 1)
reveals, after some manipulation, that @»1=@¾ 1£@»B=@¾ 2 = @»1=@¾ 2£@»B=@¾ 1. Using
this result, one can show after much algebra that the slope condition (35) becomes:









»B g(¾ 1jx)f(x)dx + D
< 1; (43)




»B G(¾ 1jx)g(¾ 2jx)f(x)dx, D > 0,
and
R »1
»B g(¾ 1jx)(1 ¡ G(¾ 2jx))f(x)dx >
R 1
»B g(¾ 1jx)f(x)dx, it follows that a su±cient
condition for (43) to hold is that
¡(1 ¡ G(¾ 1j»B))f(»B)
@»B
@¾ 2 R »1
»B G(¾ 1jx)g(¾ 2jx)f(x)dx
< 1: (44)
If condition (26) holds, then the numerator of (44) converges to zero as c vanishes, for
@»B
@¾ 2 = (cug(¾ 2j»B))=(Gx(¾ 1j»B)((1 ¡ uª)2 ¡ cu@ª=@®1)). The denominator of (44)
converges to
R 1
xu(¾ 1) G(¾ 1jx)g(¾ 2jx)f(x)dx > 0. Hence, (44) holds at c = 0 and, by
continuity, for small c > 0. Thus, (43) holds for small c > 0, and uniqueness follows.
So far we have assumed that »B is unique. But this is true for small c > 0 if
condition (42) holds, since the equilibrium thresholds are continuous in c.
C Appendix: The College Objective Function
We now show that the reduced-form model of college behavior used in the paper can be
rationalized as a game between the two colleges, in which their objective is to maximize
34the total expected caliber of the student body, subject to a capacity constraint.
Let B = fxj S(x) = f2gg, C = fxj S(x) = f1;2gg, D = fxj S(x) = f1gg, and let
A1 = C [ D and A2 = B [ C be the number of students who apply to college 1 and
college 2. To avoid trivialities, let
R
Ai f(x)dx > ·i, i = 1;2; i.e., each college receives
more applicants than the number of slots available. For simplicity, we assume that x ¸ 0.
Let gi(¾) =
R
Ai g(¾jx)f(x)dx be the density of signals given the set of applicants Ai,
i = 1;2, where g(¾jx) is any density with the MLRP. Also, let fi(xj¾) =
g(¾jx)f(x)
gi(¾) be the
conditional density of x given ¾ and Ai, i = 1;2.
With some abuse of notation, let ai(¾) be the probability that a student who has
applied to i and whose signal was ¾ accepts college i, and let °i(¾) be the expected value
of the student's caliber given that he applies to i, his signal is °, and he accepts college
i.
A strategy for college i, i = 1;2, is a (measurable) indicator function Âi : [¾;¾] !
f0;1g; i.e., a college chooses the set of signal realizations that it will accept. Then college






subject to Z ¾
¾
Âi(¾)ai(¾)gi(¾)d¾ · ·i: (46)
Note that constraint (46) must be binding at the optimum, for all students admitted
add to total caliber. Let ¸i, i = 1;2, be the multiplier associated with (46). Forming





1 if °i(¾) ¸ ¸i
0 if °i(¾) < ¸i;
(47)
where ¸i is the `shadow price' of each slot available at college i.
If we can show that °i(¾) increases in ¾ for each college i, then the optimal Âi(¾) will
be represented by a threshold ¾ i such that each college accepts students whose signals
are above ¾ i, i = 1;2. And since (46) holds with ecaliber for each college, this will
immediately justify the use of the reduced-form model.
Consider college 1. Since it is the best college, obviously a1(¾) = 1 for all ¾. Thus,
35°1(¾) =
R
A1 xf1(xj¾)dx, for being accepted by a student is uninformative. The MLRP
of g(¾jx) implies the MLRP of f1(xj¾), and therefore °1(¾) is increasing in ¾ and college
1's optimal strategy is summarized by a threshold ¾ 1. Notice that, for given applicant
pools, the determination of ¾ 1 is independent of the strategy used by college 2.








That is, a given signal ¾ could come from a student who only applied to college 2, or








It is easy to show that °2(¾) <
R
A2 xf2(xj¾)dx. This is because being accepted by a
student reduces college 2's estimate of his caliber, as there is a positive probability that
the student was rejected by college 1; i.e., college 2 su®ers an acceptance curse e®ect.




(IB(x) + ICG(¾ 1jx))f2(xj¾) R
A2(IB(x) + ICG(¾ 1jx))f2(xj¾)dx
; (50)
where IB(x) (IC(x)) is the indicator function of the set B (C). It is immediate that the
`density' h2(xj¾) has the MLRP if f2(xj¾) does, which in turn follows from the MLRP of
g(¾jx). Therefore, °2(¾) increases in ¾, and the optimal Â2(¾), given ¾ 1, is summarized
by a threshold ¾ 2 such that students are accepted if only if their signal ¾ is above ¾ 2.
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